Brief of \u3cem\u3eAmicus Curiae\u3c/em\u3e Interdisciplinary Research Team On Programmer Creativity In Support Of Respondent by Clifford, Ralph D. et al.
University of Massachusetts School of Law 




Brief of Amicus Curiae Interdisciplinary Research Team On 
Programmer Creativity In Support Of Respondent 





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/fac_pubs 




Supreme Court of the United States 






ORACLE AMERICA, INC., 
Respondent 
   
 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH TEAM ON 
PROGRAMMER CREATIVITY 




Ralph D. Clifford 
   Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae 
University of Massachusetts School of Law 
333 Faunce Corner Road 




Dated: February 13, 2020 
BATEMAN & SLADE, INC. STONEHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 
 
i 
Table of Contents 
 
Table of Cited Authorities ........................................ iii 
 
Interest of the Amicus Curiae ....................................1 
 
Summary of Argument ...............................................3 
 
I. Creativity ...............................................4 
 




I. The Court Should Clarify the 
Definition of the “Creativity” 
Needed Under Feist to Provide 
an Objective Test Based on the 
Author Having Had Available 
Multiple Variations of 
Expression from Which an 
Intellectual Choice Was Made ..............7 
 
II. The Court Should Interpret the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b), so that the 
Expressive Nature of Computer 
Software Remains Protected by 






A. The Court Should Adopt 
the Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison Test to 
Separate Ideas from 
Expressions in a Computer 
Program ..................................... 15 
 
B. Guidance is Needed from 
the Court on What 
Matters are Properly 
Filtered out of the 
Expression Within a 
Computer Program ................... 16 
 




Programs ........................ 16 
 
2. Proper Filtering 




Expressions ..................... 20 
 









Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................6 
 
Bateman v. Mnemonics, 
 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) ........................ 14 
 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................................ 4, 6, 22 
 
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 
 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) ..............................8 
 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 
 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) ...... 6, 14–16, 20, 21 
 
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 
 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001) .......................... 11 
 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
 499 U.S. 340 (1991) ...................... 4, 5, 7–10, 13 
 
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 
 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) ............................ 14 
 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 
 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) .......................... 19 
 
Holmes v. Hurst, 





Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 
 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) .......................... 5, 14 
 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 
 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
 (case below) ....................... 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 19, 22 
 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 
 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012), 
 rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
 (case below) ..................................................... 19 
 
Satava v. Lowry, 
 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003) ................ 8, 21-22 
 
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental 
 Laboratory, Inc., 










Sarah Boslaugh & Paul Andrews Watters, 
Statistics in a Nutshell (2008) ....................... 18 
 
Ralph D. Clifford, Creativity Revisited, 59 





Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the 
Era of the Creative Computer Program: 
Will the True Creator Please Stand 
Up?, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1675 (1997) ......................1 
 
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos 
Theory and Cogitation: A Search for the 
Minimal Creativity Standard in 
Copyright Law, 82 Denver L. Rev. 259 
(2004) ...................................................... 1, 4, 10 
 




questions-remain-on-future-tolls ............. 20-21 
 
Encyclopedia of Comp. Sci. (Anthony Ralston 
et al. ed. 4th ed. 2000) .................................... 22 
 
Josh Hodas, What are the main problems with 
the Y2K computer crisis and how are 
people trying to solve them?, Sci. Am., 




IBM Corp., OS/VS-VM/370 Assembler 





Trina Kershaw et al., A Decision Tree Based 
Methodology for Evaluating Creativity 
in Engineering Design, Frontiers in 
Psychology (2019), https://doi.org/ 
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00032 ................................2 
 
Firas Khatib et al., Players, Algorithm 
Discovery by Protein Folding Game 
Players, Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 
U.S.A. (2011), https://doi.org/ 
10.1073/pnas.1115898108 ................................2 
 
Donald E Knuth, Fundamental Algorithms 
§ 1.2.10 (2d ed. 1975) ...................................... 21 
 
Jay McCarthy, A Programmable 
Programming Language, Comm. of the 
ACM (Mar. 2018) ..............................................3 
 
Jay McCarthy, Cryptographic Protocol 
Explication and End-Point Projection, 
European Symp. on Research in Comp. 
Sec. (2018) .........................................................3 
 
Jay McCarthy, Model Checking Task Parallel 
Programs for Data-Race, NASA Formal 
Methods Symp. (2018) ......................................3 
 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 
 (2d Ed. 1993) ................................................... 10 
 
Mary Sweeney, Visual Basic for Testers 




Interest of the Amicus Curiae1 
 The amicus is comprised of five individuals who 
are an interdisciplinary team that is researching 
programmer creativity (“Research Team”). Each 
member is a professor with the expertise described 
below: 
• Ralph D. Clifford, the principal 
investigator, is a professor of law at the 
University of Massachusetts School of 
Law who specializes in intellectual 
property and cyberlaw issues, 
specifically including the requisite 
creativity needed for copyright. See 
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property 
in the Era of the Creative Computer 
Program: Will the True Creator Please 
Stand Up?, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1675 (1997); 
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, 
Chaos Theory and Cogitation: A Search 
for the Minimal Creativity Standard in 
Copyright Law, 82 Denver L. Rev. 259 
(2004) [hereinafter Clifford, Random 
Numbers]; Ralph D. Clifford, Creativity 
Revisited, 59 IDEA 25 (2018). Before 
obtaining his law degree, he studied 
computer science at the undergraduate 
                                                 
1 This brief was written exclusively by the amicus’s 
counsel with the exclusive generous financial support of the 
University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth. No counsel for a 
party authored any portion of this brief. The institutional 
affiliation of the individuals comprising the Amicus are for 
identification only and do not represent the position of their 
institutions. 
This brief is submitted with the blanket consent of 
Google LLC and the written consent of Oracle America, Inc. 
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level and practiced computer 
programming professionally for ten 
years. 
• Firas Khatib is an Assistant Professor of 
Computer and Information Science at 
the University of Massachusetts—
Dartmouth who specializes in 
bioinformatics and citizen science. See 
Firas Khatib et al., Players, Algorithm 
Discovery by Protein Folding Game 
Players, Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 
U.S.A. (2011), https://doi.org /10.1073/ 
pnas.1115898108. 
• Trina Kershaw is an Associate Professor 
of Psychology at the University of 
Massachusetts—Dartmouth who 
specializes in cognitive processes, the 
creative process, and creativity 
measurement in laboratory settings and 
in engineering design. See Trina 
Kershaw et al., A Decision Tree Based 
Methodology for Evaluating Creativity 
in Engineering Design, Frontiers in 
Psychology (2019), https://doi.org/ 
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00032. 
• Kavitha Chandra is the Associate Dean 
and Professor of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering at the Francis 
College of Engineering, University of 
Massachusetts—Lowell who specializes 
in computational acoustics and 
creativity in engineering. 
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• Jay McCarthy is an Associate Professor 
of Computer Science, University of 
Massachusetts—Lowell who specializes 
in the analysis of computer programs 
and programming languages, especially 
for the purposes of verifying the 
correctness and equivalence of different 
programs that attempt to do the same 
thing. See Jay McCarthy, A 
Programmable Programming Language, 
Comm. of the ACM (Mar. 2018); Jay 
McCarthy, Model Checking Task 
Parallel Programs for Data-Race, NASA 
Formal Methods Symp. (2018); Jay 
McCarthy, Cryptographic Protocol 
Explication and End-Point Projection, 
European Symp. on Research in Comp. 
Sec. (2018). 
 
Summary of Argument 
 This brief answers the two primary issues that 
are associated with the first question before the 
Court. First, the programmers’ expression of the 
Java-based application programmer interfaces 
(“APIs”) are sufficiently creative to satisfy that 
requirement of copyright law. Second, the idea-
expression limitation codified in Section 102(b) of 
Copyright Act does not establish that the APIs are 
ideas. Both of these assertions are supported by the 
empirical research undertaken by the Research 
Team. 
 
 This brief expresses no opinion on the 





 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991), teaches that all works must be 
the result of creative expression in order to qualify for 
a copyright. However, as Feist specifically addressed 
the white pages of the classic telephone book, id. at 
342, little guidance is provided for dealing with more 
expressive works such as computer programs. 
Further, language in Feist instructs that copyrighted 
works should be based on “creative spark.” Id. at 345. 
Unfortunately, this direction does little to explain 
how the “spark” is to be identified, a problem that is 
compounded by the dual expressive-functional 
characteristics of a computer program. 
 
 As a practical matter, without turning Feist’s 
creativity requirement into a subjective analysis of 
how the particular author functioned during the 
work’s creation, or allowing it to become an excuse for 
the judicial censorship much feared by this Court 
more than a hundred years ago in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 
(1903).2 an objective measurement is needed. 
Consequently, “creativity” should be found where it is 
apparent that the author had many different ways a 
particular idea could have been expressed, from 
which the author made an intellectually-based 
selection. See Clifford, Random Numbers at 295–96. 
 
                                                 
2 “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. ... At the other end, copyright would be 




 When this is applied to the APIs in question in 
this litigation (“Oracle’s APIs”), it is clear that the 
Feist creativity requirement is met. See Oracle Am., 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 & 1356–57 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (case below). As our research 
demonstrates, even the simplest computer program is 
capable of being expressed in many ways.3 As 
programs become more complex, the number of 
unique solutions also increases.4 Consequently, as 
there are clearly choices for a programmer to make 
from a wide variety of expressions, Feist creativity 
exists for the vast majority of computer programs 
including Oracle’s APIs. 
 
II. Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act codifies the 
requirement that a copyright’s protection be limited 
to the expression created by the author, expressly 
excluding the ideas that underlie the creation. 
Separating ideas from expressions has never been 
easy; indeed, courts have long struggled with 
establishing guidance on how to make this 
distinction. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Picture 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). 
When applied to the technical writing that is 
programming, drawing the distinction becomes more 
                                                 
3 The Research Team’s preliminary study involves 
correctly functioning code submitted by multiple programmers 
to solve the same problem. The simplest program in our research 
set—searching for the most frequent character pattern within a 
larger string—demonstrated a large variety of solutions: 20 
unique solutions were created by the 27 programmers. 
4 On the most complex program in the research set, 23 
unique solutions were submitted by the 26 programmers who 
solved the problem. 
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difficult as those defining the line rarely have 
sufficient technological background to inherently 
understand what the programmer has written. 
 
 Despite the difficulty of analysis, there is a 
developing accord among the circuit courts that the 
analytical approach established for literary works in 
Nichols is an appropriate approach for separating the 
ideas and expressions within a computer program. 
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 
982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445–46 (9th 
Cir. 1994). But see Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 
1986). This analytic approach was adopted by the 
Federal Circuit in the case at bar, see Oracle, 750 F.3d 
at 1357 (applying 9th Circuit precedents), and should 
now be established as the appropriate methodology 
for all copyright cases, including those that involve 
computer software. 
 
 Care and guidance is needed, however, for the 
lower courts to properly apply the abstracting and 
filtering process to computer programs. First, as 
matters are abstracted, care is needed in 
distinguishing between public domain ideas and 
public domain expressions. Reusing a public domain 
idea does not impact the expression’s copyrightability 
as all are free to re-express the idea. See Bleistein, 
188 U.S. at 249.5 Only if the author is attempting to 
recapture a public domain expression should the 
courts prevent the attempt. Second, artificial 
distinctions should not be imposed on computer 
                                                 
5 “Others are free to copy the original. They are not free 
to copy the copy.” 
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programs because they are assertedly the result of 
engineering-based rather than artistically-based 
human inspiration. As our research demonstrates, 
expressive creativity underlies both types of 
inspiration at a level sufficient to satisfy Feist. The 
conclusion that directly flows from this is that, as with 
other literary works protected by copyrights, 
computer programs are primarily expressive. 
 
 The secondary conclusion that flows from this 
is the limited applicability of the merger doctrine in 
evaluating computer software copyrights. Rather 
than only having a limited number of expressions 
available, the programmer has a large number from 
which to choose. 
 
Argument 
I. The Court Should Clarify the Definition of the 
“Creativity” Needed Under Feist to Provide an 
Objective Test Based on the Author Having 
Had Available Multiple Variations of 
Expression from Which an Intellectual Choice 
Was Made 
 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), this Court 
established that there is a threshold of creativity that 
must be contained within a compilation of facts in 
order for a copyright to subsist. See id. at 348. The 
Court stated: 
 
[T]he work [must be] independently 
created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works), and [must] 
possess[] at least some minimal degree 
of creativity. To be sure, the requisite 
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level of creativity is extremely low; even 
a slight amount will suffice. The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative 
spark, no matter how crude, humble or 
obvious it might be. Originality does not 
signify novelty; a work may be original 
even though it closely resembles other 
works so long as the similarity is 
fortuitous, not the result of copying. 
 
Id. at 345 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
 While the Court’s Feist opinion suggests that 
this creativity requirement is a requisite of all 
copyrighted works, not just compilations, see id., the 
Court’s discussion of creativity in the context of a 
factual compilation provides clouded guidance as to 
the nature of the requirement for more fanciful works 
such as the computer programs in the case at bar. The 
resulting contradictory holdings of the circuit courts 
when addressing fanciful works bear witness to the 
need for a clarifying ruling on the meaning of 
copyright creativity. Compare, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003) (disallowing copyright in 
an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with Boisson v. 
Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing 
copyright in much simpler quilt design). This same 
confusion concerning the appropriate standard arises 
in the evaluation of computer programs as stated by 
the court below: “Circuit courts have struggled with, 
and disagree over, the tests to be employed when 
attempting to draw the line between what is 
protectable expression and what is not.” Oracle, 750 
F.3d at 1357. Consequently, this Court should clarify 
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the standard of creativity for works such as those at 
bar that are more fanciful than the white pages from 
a telephone book. 
 
 At its core, Feist seemed most concerned with 
the choices that were available to and made by the 
author. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. The Court stated, 
 
The compilation author typically chooses 
which facts to include, in what order to 
place them, and how to arrange the 
collected data so that they may be used 
effectively by readers. These choices as 
to selection and arrangement, so long as 
they are made independently by the 
compiler and entail a minimal degree of 
creativity, are sufficiently original that 
Congress may protect such compilations 
through the copyright laws. 
Id. 
 
 Producing computer programs and other more 
fanciful works clearly exceeds the mere “choosing” 
and “ordering” found in a factual compilation. To 
clarify how the Feist holding applies to these more 
fanciful works, the two prerequisites required of a 
compilation should be restated and required of any 
work, including Oracle’s APIs. Authors of fanciful 
works do not choose and order facts; instead, they 
choose how to express a concept from the multitude of 
ways in which this can be done. This choice-making 
can serve as the foundation for an objective creativity 
test for non-compilation works. In other words, to be 
copyrightable, all works must result from their 
authors making choices from a multitude of possible 
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ways of expressing the work. See Clifford, Random 
Numbers at 295–96. 
 
 Determining if this has occurred would be 
practical as part of the fact-finding of the courts. To 
determine if the minimum creativity required is 
present, the court would need to examine the work to 
determine that the author had choices and made a 
decision to express the work in the way it was done. 
Fundamentally, to determine if creativity exists 
within a work, it must be established that the author 
“ma[d]e a judgment, ... determine[d] a preference; [or] 
c[a]me to a conclusion,” Decide, Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 517 (2d Ed. 1993), about the 
expression used. Only where this decision making is 
apparent can the courts be sure that the “modicum of 
creativity” required by Feist, 499 U.S. at 362, exists 
within the work. 
 
 When this type of test is applied to computer 
software, our research shows that the typical program 
complies. In our initial research protocol, 27 student 
programmers were given four problems to solve that 
required them to write software.6 Each submitted 
program was tested and successfully solved the 
assigned problem before it was included in the 
research dataset. 
 
 Having built the dataset, the code generated 
was analyzed based on the number of each 
“fundamental programming construct” the 
                                                 
6 The students were all in a course that addressed using 
computer technology to solve processing problems associated 
with DNA research. 
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programmer had used to produce the code.7 By 
determining all of the constructs used by each 
programmer, expressive differences in the code was 
captured based on the different choices of constructs 
made by the programmers. As an example, one 
programmer might have chosen to write part of the 
code based on a “for” loop while another might have 
chosen a “while” loop. Ultimately, as both programs 
achieved a solution to the same problem, the choice of 
which loop type to use becomes expressive as neither 
has computational advantage over the other. By 
accumulating all of these differences over all of the 
different types of constructs, an overall program 
description code could be created. If two programs had 
the same description code assigned to it, they were 
expressively the same;8 if the description code 
differed, significantly different ways were used to 
express the same programming function. 
 
 The first problem assigned to the programmers 
was to determine the most frequent character pattern 
of a certain size within a larger string. This problem 
is not trivial to code but is also not computationally 
complex. Most programmers would be able to 
correctly code a solution within a few hours. When the 
                                                 
7 A “programming construct” is a particular instruction 
that all programming languages provide. Our research identified 
seven of these: subroutines, for loops, while loops, if statements, 
else statements, case statements, and go to statements. 
8 This excludes differences based on the variables and 
other names chosen by the programmer. Our research also 
captures these differences, but has discounted them here as a 
change in variable name, standing alone, is the kind of trivial 
variation that is given little credence in copyright law. Cf. 
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“A person’s name ... is not a work of authorship....”). 
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programs solving this problem within our dataset 
were analyzed, however, the number of unique 
solutions submitted was significantly large. In fact, 
there were 20 unique solutions among the 27 
programs written to solve the problem, a percentage 
of variation of 74.1%. 
 
 As would be expected, more complex problems 
had a larger number of unique solutions. A later 
assignment given to the programmers required that 
they develop code that solves for what is known as a 
“greedy motif search with pseudocounts” problem.9 
Twenty-three unique solutions were submitted 
among the 26 solutions submitted (one programmer 
failed to submit a valid program), a percentage of 
variation of 88.5%. 
 
 What this demonstrates is that there are a 
multitude of programs that can be expressed to solve 
even fairly trivial computer programming problems. 
More directly, there are a large number of expressive 
choices from which each programmer-author can 
                                                 
9 The goal of the “greedy motif search” algorithm is to 
find similar motifs in long segments of DNA sequences. A “motif” 
is a short string of DNA that denotes the location in the full DNA 
string where a regulatory protein should attach in order for the 
DNA to carry out its gene expression purpose. 
 The search algorithm is complicated because motifs from 
similar DNA sequences contain minor variations and are 
therefore not identical. This introduces the need for probability 
determinations when comparing a potential motif to a DNA 
string. As probabilities of zero would cause significant 
processing problems, “pseudocounts” are used to mathematically 
prevent zeros from occurring. 
 
13 
choose an expression of his or her desire.10 Feist’s 
standard of creativity based on making choices among 
expressions has been established. 
 
 Of course, in the case at bar, the degree of 
complexity of the software in litigation far exceeds the 
relatively uncomplicated programs in our research 
dataset. Oracle’s APIs involve thousands of lines of 
code to define the “overall system of organized 
names—covering 37 packages, with over six hundred 
classes, with over six thousand methods.” Oracle, 750 
F.3d at 1351. In creating Oracle’s APIs, the 
programmers created at least “thousands of 
individual elements” resulting in “7,000 lines of 
declaring code” as that was what Google copied. Id. at 
1349 & 1353. Within these thousands of methods and 
lines of code, numerous expressive decisions were 
made. As a de minimus example, even the choice to 
call the example function described by the court below 
“MAX” rather than “MAXIMUM” or “LARGER,” 
represents an expressive choice. See id. at 1349–50. 
 
 Consequently, the Court should find that 
sufficient creativity exists in Oracle’s APIs to satisfy 
the Feist creativity standard. This requires an 
examination of the idea/expression dichotomy. 
 
  
                                                 
10 If the programmer’s choice of variable names is 
included, every program becomes completely unique. 
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II. The Court Should Interpret the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), 
so that the Expressive Nature of Computer 
Software Remains Protected by Copyright 
 Distinguishing between an idea and its 
expression has never been easy. See Nichols v. 
Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930) (L. Hand, J.). See also Holmes v. Hurst, 174 
U.S. 82, 86 (1899). Despite the analytical difficulty 
required, the fundamental approach established by 
Judge Hand—abstracting the content of the work at 
decreasing levels of detail and searching among these 
abstractions for the point where allowing the 
copyright would result in the copyright preempting 
the underlying idea, see Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121—
provides a compelling and logical solution to the 
problem of applying Section 102(b) presented by the 
case at bar. Indeed, this abstraction and examination 
approach has been widely adopted and is part of the 
most widely accepted test among the Circuit Courts of 
Appeal for copyright infringement of a computer 
program, see, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th 
Cir. 1993); Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532, 
1543–46 (11th Cir. 1996); Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355–
56 (case below). This analytical approach has not been 
universally adopted, however, as the Third Circuit 
has endorsed a much more intuitive approach. See 
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 





A. The Court Should Adopt the 
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test 
to Separate Ideas from Expressions in a 
Computer Program 
 Upon examination, the Computer Assocs. 
approach—the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison 
Test—is more meritorious than Whelan’s intuitive 
approach.11 It is vital that courts scrutinize computer 
programs that are claimed for copyright to enforce the 
idea/expression dichotomy found in Section 102(b). As 
with other fact-based works, the intertwining of 
expressions and ideas within a computer program 
require a critical examination and dissection of it. 
This is made more crucial as computer software both 
expresses and implements the programmer’s code. 
Further, unlike English language works, computer 
programs are not communicative to non-specialists, 
limiting the power of an intuitive approach to reach a 
valid conclusion. 
 
 Consequently, this Court should adopt the 
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test to 
implement section 102(b). This approach, described in 
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706–11, provides the 
appropriate foundation for understanding the 
dividing line between ideas and expressions in 
computer programs. Unlike the Whelan approach, 
this test requires a careful consideration of the 
copyrighted software and insures that its author 
                                                 
11 Whelan is mostly criticized here for its approach and 
its limits. The Whelan court quite accurately excluded the basic 
business purpose of the software in the case under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b), but failed to examine the code for other ideas that 




maintains rights to the expression while allowing all 
others use of any contained ideas. Whelan does not do 
this. Limiting the idea in computer software to what 
the overall purpose of the program is designed to 
achieve, see Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236, removes many 
ideas (both of business processing and computer 
programming) from use by improperly including 
these within the copyright. 
 
B. Guidance is Needed from the Court on 
What Matters are Properly Filtered out 
of the Expression Within a Computer 
Program 
1. Proper Filtering Recognizes the 
Expressive Nature of Computer 
Programs 
Computer Assocs. was mostly on point about 
the details of how to exclude ideas from coverage by 
the copyright, expressed in the “filtering” part of the 
court’s tripartite test. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 
at 707–10. When a particular expression is present 
within software only because that expression is 
needed in order for the software to operate on the 
target hardware, Computer Assocs. was correct in 
excluding that statement from consideration as part 
of the expression. See id. at 709–10. Indeed, our 
research indirectly confirms this as the machine-
oriented programming constructs were excluded from 
our dataset as including them mis-characterized the 
similarities within the different programmer’s code. 
Similarly, the presence or absence of any given 
fundamental programming construct in itself should 
not be considered expression as these are required to 
produce all computer programs written in procedural 
languages. As the line moves from the individual 
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statement types to selected combinations of the 
constructs, however, the copyright line between idea 
and expression has been crossed and the realm of 
expressions has been reached. As our research 
demonstrates, even simple programming tasks can 
result in a wide range of possible expressions, 
negating an assertion that computer programs are 
mostly ideas rather than the expression of them. 
Instead, our research establishes that computer 
programs are highly expressive with significant 
variations existing in how even the simplest program 
is written. Our research has established this in two 
ways. 
 
 First, we examined the number of unique 
versions of each program that were submitted.12 
These calculations showed that almost 75% of the 
simplest programs were different from all of the 
others and almost 90% of the more complicated 
programs varied. Based on this, we determined that 
variation was the norm, not the exception. 
 
 Second, to confirm our preliminary findings, 
the Research Team subjected the multiple versions of 
the four programs to formal statistical analysis. By 
examining the average number of times each 
fundamental programming construct was used in 
comparison to each’s standard deviation, the large 
degree of variation was clear. Surprisingly, for three 
of the constructs (subroutines, for loops, and else 
statements), the standard deviation was actually 
larger than the average. While the inherent meaning 
of this is limited, it does suggest that the data points 
                                                 
12 The methodology used to make this determination is 
set forth above. See supra pp. 10–13. 
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are widely scattered and may exist without a defining 
pattern. In other words, the programmers do not 
choose to use the constructs based on any defined 
underlying rule; rather, they are making 
intellectually-based choices among the possible 
expressions. To test this, we assumed the opposite 
and performed an univariate ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) based on the constructs each example 
program used. An ANOVA procedure is a way to test 
if there are significant mean group differences on a 
variable of interest. See Sarah Boslaugh & Paul 
Watters, Statistics in a Nutshell 232–38 (2008). For 
example, an ANOVA can determine if the number of 
“for” loops used by each programmer was compelled 
by a factor such as the algorithm rather than 
individual choice. In other words, a non-significant 
ANOVA test would establish that there was no 
expressive creativity used in the programming effort. 
 
 In fact, our analysis established a high degree 
of variation among the choices made by the 
programmers with F-test scores ranging from 11.97 
through 39.51.13 Values this high on an F-test is 
consistent with a large degree of variation in the code 
and rejects the null hypothesis that there is an 
underlying common justification for the choice of 
which set of programming constructs to use. To 
summarize the statistical analysis, it shows that the 
choice of programming constructs by each 
programmer are unconstrained by a common 
variable. Consequently, programmers are making 
creative expressive choices. 
                                                 
13 The p-test score for these results were less than .0001, 




 Because of this kind of difference being found 
within computer code, it is unlikely that the copyright 
merger concept, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. 
v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971), will 
provide any help for evaluating computer software. As 
a result, the district court’s reliance on the merger 
doctrine to invalidate the Oracle copyright, see Oracle 
Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 998 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (case below), was misplaced and the 
Federal Circuit was correct to overrule the lower 
court’s decision on this ground. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 
1360. Our research has established that even for the 
simplest code in the dataset (programs that are 25 to 
50 lines in length), so many alternative methods of 
expression existed that asserting that the idea and 
expression have merged in any computer program—
except the most trivial—is unsustainable. When the 
degree of coding variation found within computer code 
is scaled up to software on the scope of Oracle’s APIs, 
merger is impossible. 
  
 The fact that the copyrighted expression in 
litigation is only the declaring code rather than the 
operational or implementing code, see Oracle, 750 
F.3d at 1349, does not change this analysis. While 
there were obviously considerably more choices made 
by the programmers who created the operable aspects 
of Oracle’s APIs, more than enough creative choices 
were made by them in creating the 7,000 lines of 
declaring code, see id. at 1349 & 1353, to satisfy the 
copyright requirements. 
 
 In summary, when Oracle’s APIs are 
examined, it is clear that there were thousands of 
different ways the APIs could have been written when 
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they were created. As a result, the Federal Circuit 
was correct to determine that they are protected from 
copying by the Copyright Act. 
 
2. Proper Filtering Does Not 
Establish Improper Barriers to 
Protecting Programming 
Expressions 
 Although our research established the viability 
of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the 
Computer Assocs. court made a significant mistake 
when it attempted to address the overall efficiency of 
a computer algorithm. According to the Second 
Circuit, the more efficient a computer program is, the 
more likely it is to be an idea rather than an 
expression. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 707–
09 (treating efficiency as an idea as a matter of law). 
This holding is based on a mistaken view of efficiency 
both within computer programming and within the 
broader engineering disciplines in which it resides 
and is inconsistent with our research. 
 
  The Computer Assocs. court misunderstood 
efficiency as it exists within an engineering discipline 
such as computer science. Unlike the court’s view, 
there is no single point of efficiency that programs 
attempt to reach with success meaning that an idea 
has been reached. Instead, all programming efforts 
result in the programmer balancing a multitude of 
considerations that are often contradictory.14 In 
                                                 
14 This same thing is true in all other engineering 
disciplines. Recently, for example, the Tappan Zee bridge across 
the Hudson River in New York was replaced. See Karen DeWitt, 




programming, for example, greater speed can often be 
achieved, but only as an escalating cost. Even speed 
of operation, itself, may not be the most important 
criteria; indeed, in earlier programming efforts, 
limiting the amount of storage space that was needed 
by the program was typically far more critical than 
achieving blinding processing speed.15 Furthermore, 
when applied to something as complex as computer 
software, determining efficiency becomes 
extraordinarily difficult as most times the evaluation 
has to be reduced to probabilities as the data being 
processed can radically affect the resulting speed. See 
Donald E. Knuth, Fundamental Algorithms § 1.2.10 
(2d ed. 1975). In summary, achieving some type of 
efficiency within a computer program does not 
transform it into an idea. 
 
 Similarly, the courts below have often failed to 
carefully distinguish between public domain 
expressions which should be filtered out of a work and 
public domain ideas which should not. See, e.g., 
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714–15; Satava, 323 
                                                 
set-to-open-questions-remain-on-future-tolls. Determining 
which of the two bridges is the more “efficient” one makes no real 
sense. Does that analysis focus on cost? The number of cars that 
can be carried? The size of the largest truck that can safely cross? 
The bridge’s attractiveness? Clearly, “efficiency” is not a single 
point. 
15 This need for storage efficiency lead to a problem that 
was known as the “Y2K” problem as programmers, for years, had 
saved storage space by not storing the “19" that was associated 
with the year; instead,1965 would be stored as 65, thus saving ½ 
of the needed space. See Josh Hodas, What are the main 
problems with the Y2K computer crisis and how are people 





F.3d at 810. As this Court best expressed it in 
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249, “[o]thers are free to copy 
the original. They are not free to copy the copy.” In the 
case at bar, Google was free to re-express the idea of 
APIs in general, including the functional 
characteristics needed by application programmers.16 
Google was not free merely to copy Oracle’s 
expression. 
 
 Finally, as the Federal Circuit ruled below, 
Google’s desire to achieve interoperability—or more 
accurately, its goal to reduce the chance that its 
programmers would be confused by a different API 
system—is not relevant to whether Oracle’s APIs 
were ideas. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1371.17 Ideas exist 
independently of how another may wish to use it. By 
analogy, many may wish to use the Hogwarts world 
created by J.K. Rowling or the Middle-Earth world 
created by J.R.R. Tolkien, but both are creative 
expressions of their authors and, thus, are protectable 
by copyright. Of course, neither author’s copyright 
protects the idea of having a world of magic, so future 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the general concept of an API has existed by 
that name since at least the early 2000s. See Mary Sweeney, 
Visual Basic for Testers 211 (2001) (discussing the “APIs” used 
in Microsoft Windows). Of course, the concept without the name 
existed for decades before that. See Macro Assemblers, 
Encyclopedia of Comp. Sci. 99–100 (Anthony Ralston et al. ed. 
4th ed. 2000) (describing achieving standard programming tasks 
by using the macro system available with 1960–1980-era IBM 
computers); IBM Corp., OS/VS-VM/370 Assembler 
Programmer’s Guide 69 (5th ed. 1982) (defining “library macro 
definition” as “IBM-supplied ... macro definitions”). 
17 As the Federal Circuit acknowledged, interoperability 
may be relevant to a fair use analysis. See id. at 1369–70. This 
brief takes no position on this question. 
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authors can always express their own versions. 
Similarly in the case at bar, Oracle was free to express 
its own “world” of APIs. If Google wants one too, it is 
free to create one. Google should not be free, however, 
to appropriate what Oracle had already expressed. 
 
Conclusion 
 For the reasons discussed above, the Court 
should affirm the decision of the Federal Circuit that 
the Respondent’s software APIs are protected by valid 
copyrights. The APIs are creative expressions worthy 
of copyright protection. Providing this protection will 
not stop others, including Google, from developing its 
own set of APIs. 
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